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Abstract
Discusses the Exon-Florio Provision of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act. It gives
the President of the United States the power to prohibit or to prevent on a temporary basis a non-
U.S. corporation from merging with or acquiring a U.S. corporation when the transaction could
potentially impair U.S. national security. The Note examines U.S. legislation that regulates di-
rect investment and argues that the U.S. Congress should amend Exon-Florio in order to focus
and strengthen the Provision’s application to transactions involving U.S. defense production com-
panies. Part I of this Note sets forth the existing procedural and administrative requirements of
Exon-Florio and explains several modifications to the Provision that Congress has recently en-
acted. Part II outlines additional proposed modifications to Exon-Florio that have been presented
before Congress and considers such proposals with respect to a recent case involving the Provi-
sion. Part III argues that Congress should amend Exon-Florio in order to focus and confine the
Provision’s application to national defense. This Note concludes that such modifications would
be justifiable because they would define national defense as a narrow exception to the traditional
U.S. globalist trade policy and, consequently, benefit all those involved in international mergers,
acquisitions and takeovers in the United States.
NOTES
AMENDING THE TREATMENT OF DEFENSE
PRODUCTION ENTERPRISES UNDER THE U.S. EXON-
FLORIO PROVISION: A MOVE TOWARD
PROTECTIONISM OR GLOBALISM?
INTRODUCTION
Direct investment can be defined as significant long-term
investment in domestic companies by non-resident entities.'
The advantages and disadvantages of such investment to the
countries in which it occurs have been the subject of much de-
bate.2 While some countries have chosen to regulate virtually
all forms of direct investment, others have decided to regulate
only certain industries.3 Still other countries have taken a
more passive approach and refrained from regulating any form
of direct investment for fear that such regulation would be
construed as protectionist in nature.4
In recent years, the number of non-U.S. corporations ac-
quiring or merging with U.S. corporations in the United States
1. Alan Toulin, Canada Must Rise to the Investment Challenge, FIN. POST, Sept. 23,
1992, at 13.
2. See Stephen M. Banker, Protection vs. Globalization; The Regulatory Response to
Cross-Border Transactions, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 25, 1991, at 7. While some commentators
have suggested that direct investment stimulates the economy of the particular coun-
try in which it occurs because it creates jobs and improves technology, others have
suggested that such investment threatens the economic and political viability of the
particular country because it permits non-resident investors to reap the benefits of
one country's economy and extend such benefits to another economy. Id.; United
States Should Have 'Serious Debate'on Foreign Investment Policy, ABA Told, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 669 (May 1, 1991).
Traditionally, controversy has arisen whenever non-resident companies have
made significant investments in domestic industries. See Banker, supra. Still, one of
the more recent areas of debate, particularly in the United States, relates to non-
resident entities investing in domestic defense manufacturing companies. Id. In any
event, all types of direct investment have been the subject of legislation in various
countries, including the United States. Id.
3. See generally Simon MacLachlan & William Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in
Europe-Practicability, Disclosure and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAw. 373 (1989);
SIMEON & AssocIES, MOQUET BORDE & AssOCIES, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE
§ 1.04(1] (1992).
4. See Foreign Investment: U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Take-
overs, Seminar Told, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 180 (Sept. 16, 1992).
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has increased dramatically.5 Pursuant to a U.S. globalist trade
philosophy, an overwhelming majority of these transactions
have taken place without encountering any U.S. legislative or
regulatory barriers.6 Despite this philosophy, however, excep-
tions in the interest of national security have been carved out
of the U.S. open investment policy.7
In an attempt to monitor and, at times, prevent direct in-
vestment in the United States, particularly in areas implicating
national security, the U.S. Congress has enacted legislation to
monitor certain types of transactions involving non-U.S. inves-
tors in the United States.8 Specifically, under the Exon-Florio
provision ("Exon-Florio" or the "Provision") of the Omnibus
Trade & Competitiveness Act9 ("Omnibus Trade Act"), the
5. Anthony F. Essaye & Dale C. Turza, The Next Step in Regulating Foreign Invest-
ments, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 1, 1990, at 5. These transactions include the Sony Corporation's
acquisition of Columbia Pictures, which constitutes the firstJapanese acquisition of a
U.S. media company, and the Mitsubishi Estate Company's acquisition of an interest
in Rockefeller Center. Id. According to at least one U.S. government source, foreign
investment in the United States totalled approximately US$329,000,000,000 during
the late 1980s. International Taxes, International Tax Policy Makers Should Strive For Bal-
ance, Treasury Official Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) G-7 (Mar. 2, 1990). This
amount sharply contrasts with the same figure for 1966 which was
US$9,000,000,000.
6. See Banker, supra note 2, at 7. This situation can be attributed to former Pres-
ident Bush's trade policy, which welcomed direct investment that fluctuates in re-
sponse to market forces and imposed as few regulations on trade as possible. Subcom-
mittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy Senate Banking Committee (June 4, 1992)
(Testimony of Frederick W. Volcansek, Acting Assistant Secretary for Trade Devel-
opment, U.S. Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Volcansek Testimony], avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
Under the United States' traditional laissez-faire approach to direct investment,
the free market ultimately decides the most efficient allocation of business resources.
Foreign Investment: U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Takeovers, Seminar
Told, supra note 4, at 180; W. Jeffers Pickard, CEOs For Clinton?, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Sept. 30, 1992, at A-16. Thus, the government refrains from regulating
business as much as possible, maintaining that any attempt to manipulate the market
will fail and ultimately harm the U.S. economy. See Foreign Investment: U.S. Has Unco-
ordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Takeovers, Seminar Told, supra note 4, at 180.
7. Volcansek Testimony, supra note 6.
8. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 2158 (1950)).
9. Id. The Exon-Florio provision actually expired on October 20, 1990. Lapse in
Exon-Florio; Uncertainty Affects Deals Involving Foreigners, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1991, at 5.
On August 17, 1991, however, then President George Bush signed H.R. 991, which
made Exon-Florio a permanent provision of the Defense Production Act, Pub. L. No.
102-99, 105 Stat. 487. See Bush Signs Defense Measure Making Exon-Florio Permanent,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1248 (Aug. 21, 1991).
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President of the United States has the power to prohibit or to
prevent on a temporary basis a non-U.S. corporation from
merging with or acquiring a U.S. corporation when the trans-
action potentially could impair U.S. national security.'0 The
current structure and application of Exon-Florio has been the
subject of much conflict in the United States as well as in other
countries." In particular, some critics have asserted that
Exon-Florio is both weak and ineffective and, therefore, re-
quires extensive modification.' 2 Others have argued that any
increase in the scope or application of Exon-Florio will ulti-
mately harm the U.S. economy.'
10. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5021. Specifically, the Omnibus
Trade Act states that
the President or the President's designee may make an investigation to de-
termine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and take-
overs proposed or pending on or after the date of enactment of this section
by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of persons
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States .... [Furthermore,]
the President may take such action for such time as the President considers
appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States proposed or
pending on or after the date of enactment of this section by or with foreign
persons so that such control will not threaten to impair the national security.
Id.
11. EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated With Exon-Florio, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
300 (Feb. 19, 1992); Foreign Investment, Treasury Reiterates Opposition to Changes in Exon-
Florio, Industry Views Are Mixed, Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 6, 1992).
12. Foreign Investment: U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Take-
overs, Seminar Told, supra note 4, at 180; 'Major Reforms' in Monitoring Defense-Related
Acquisitions Urged, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1424 (Aug. 19, 1992).
13. See Foreign Investment, U.S. Welcomes Foreign Investment, Urges Other Countries to
Do Same, President Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-6 (Dec. 30, 1991) (discuss-
ing Bush administration's anti-protectionist policies on direct investment).
Many of the same concerns facing the United States with respect to direct invest-
ment have also arisen and been addressed in other countries. See generally MacLach-
Ian & Mackesy, supra note 3, at 381-83 (discussing European regulation of mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers in the European Community). For example, some Euro-
pean countries have enacted legislation that limits and, at times, completely restricts
direct investment within their borders. CCH International, Doing Business in Eu-
rope (France), 25,640, 26,702; CCH International, Doing Business in Europe (It-
aly), 51,000, 52,152; CCH International, Doing Business in Europe (Spain),
75,800, 76,903; ALLAN W. JOHNSTONE, UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FRANCE:
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FRENCH CHARGES (1965). France, for example, has a policy
that limits foreign ownership of the country's important assets, as well as a plan to
retain and expand its critical technologies and industries. See Susan J. Tolchin, The
United Bazaar of America: Defense Industries for Sale, WASH. POST, May 31, 1992, at C-4.
The French government refers to these regulations, which limit direct investment, as
serving the "national interest." Id.
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This Note examines U.S. legislation that regulates direct
investment and argues that the U.S. Congress should amend
Exon-Florio in order to focus and strengthen the Provision's
application to transactions involving U.S. defense production
companies. Part I of this Note sets forth the existing proce-
dural and administrative requirements of Exon-Florio and ex-
plains several modifications to the Provision that Congress has
recently enacted. Part II outlines additional proposed modifi-
cations to Exon-Florio that have been presented before Con-
gress and considers such proposals with respect to a recent
case involving the Provision. Part III argues that Congress
should amend Exon-Florio in order to focus and confine the
Provision's application to national defense. This Note con-
cludes that such modifications would be justifiable because
they would define national defense as a narrow exception to
the traditional U.S. globalist trade policy and, consequently,
benefit all those involved in international mergers, acquisitions
and takeovers in the United States.
I. CURRENT U.S. LEGISLATION REGARDING
DIRECT INVESTMENT
The Exon-Florio provision of the Omnibus Trade & Com-
petitiveness Act addresses direct investment in the United
States and, in particular, involves the voluntary disclosure of
international transactions that bear on "national security. 11 4
The Provision is designed to protect two aspects of national
security: maintenance of a substantial defense industry to en-
sure that the United States can rapidly build up its military
when necessary, and prevention of the transfer of sensitive mil-
itary technologies to hostile nations.' 5 The National Defense
14. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1950)). For a discussion of "national security," see infra notes
42-61 and accompanying text.
15. Gerald T. Nowak, Note, Above All, Do No Harm: The Application of the Exon-
Florio Amendment to Dual-Use Technologies, 13 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 1002, 1003 (1992); Bush
Expected to Sign Bill Making Exon-Florio Permanent, ABA Panel Told, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) (Aug. 15, 1991) (containing comments of G. Christopher Griner, former offi-
cial in the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel).
The Exon-Florio provision was enacted in the wake of a controversial proposed
acquisition involving the Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, a U.S. defense con-
tractor, and Fujitsu, a Japanese corporation. See Nowak, supra, at 1007. After an-
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 is a recent amendment
to Exon-Florio that modifies and supplements the Provision in
light of these objectives.' 6
A. The Exon-Florio Provision
The Exon-Florio provision authorizes the President or the
President's "designee" to investigate non-U.S. entities' pro-
posed mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers in order to evaluate
their potential effect on U.S. "national security.""' Currently,
the responsibility for implementing Exon-Florio is delegated
to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
("CFIUS" or the "Committee"),' 8 which monitors non-U.S.
mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers through voluntary fil-
ings.' 9 In the event CFIUS decides that a transaction could
adversely affect national security, it refers the matter to the
President, who then makes the ultimate decision whether to
suspend or to block the transaction.20
1. The Structure and Function of Exon-Florio and the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Under Exon-Florio, the President must base a decision to
prohibit or to suspend a transaction on credible evidence that
the non-U.S. investor might take action that threatens to im-
pair national security and existing laws do not provide ade-
quate and appropriate authority for the President to protect
nouncing its intentions to acquire Fairchild, Fujitsu encountered a significant amount
of criticism, which ultimately caused Fujitsu to back down from the transaction. See
id.; Donna K.H. Walters & William C. Rempel, The Fairchild Deal; Trade War: When
Chips Were Down, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 1; Donna K.H. Walters & William C.
Rempel, Trade War Victim; A One-Time Winner Is Out Of Chips, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1987,
at 1.
16. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992)
17. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1950)).
18. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618-24 (1988), reprinted in 19 U.S.C.
§ 2901 (1988). CFIUS was originally established during the Ford Administration to
monitor direct investments in the United States. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R.
990-92 (1971-1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
19. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5021; Foreign Investment, U.S. Has
Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Takeovers, Seminar Told, supra note 4, at 180.
20. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5021.
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national security.21 When evaluating the effect of a particular
transaction on national security, the President may consider,
among other factors, domestic production required for pro-
jected national defense needs, the capability and capacity of
domestic industries to meet national defense requirements,
and the impact of domestic industries and commercial activity
by non-U.S. citizens on the capability and capacity of the
United States to meet the demands of national security.22
In order to facilitate the President's decisions regarding
Exon-Florio transactions, the Committee on Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States, an inter-agency administrative body,
was formed to collect and analyze data on direct investment in
the United States.23 The chairman of CFIUS is the Director of
21. Id. Such existing laws do not include the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. V, at 202, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977)
(current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1992)), nor the Exon-Florio provision,
itself. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5021. Primarily, the IEEPA pro-
vides the President with the authority to deal with any unusual and extraordinary
threat to national security, foreign policy, or the economy of the United States, if the
threat results from a non-U.S. source and the President declares a national emer-
gency with respect to such threat. 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (1992)). For a discussion of the IEEPA as a statutory source of presi-
dential emergency power, see M.P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS & U.S. TRADE
(1990).
Exon-Florio applies only to transactions where a non-U.S. entity would gain
"control" of a U.S. entity. Victor I. Lewkow & Christopher E. Austin, Regulation of
Foreign Investment in the U.S., INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1992, (Int'l M&A Supp.), at 71.
Under the provision, control does not refer to a percentage of ownership in the ac-
quired entity (the "target"), but rather is defined in terms of the effective power of
the acquiring entity to make certain decisions for the target. Id.
22. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5021. In 1992, Congress added
additional factors that the President may consider in determining whether a transac-
tion affects national security. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2315 (1992); see also infra notes 64-66
and accompanying text (discussing additional considerations President may consider
under National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993).
In practice, the President has utilized Exon-Florio only once to block a merger.
Lewkow & Austin, supra note 21. This infrequency results, in part, from the Bush
Administration's narrow interpretation of the term "national security" as well as an
overall concern that increases in trade restrictions will discourage investment that is
vital to the U.S. economy. Foreign Investment, House Energy Committee Begins Markup of
Exon-Florio Modifications, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-10 (Nov. 20, 1991); For-
eign Investment, International Investment Group Labels Exon-Florio Changes Cumbersome,
Harmful, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-17 (Nov. 18, 1991); Foreign Investment,
U.S. Welcomes Foreign Investment, Urges Other Countries to Do Same, President Says, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-6 (Dec. 30, 1991).
23. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990-92 (1971-1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C.
§ 78b (1981).
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the Office of International Investment, Department of the
Treasury and its members include representatives from the
Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Council of
Economic Advisors, as well as the Attorney General and the
U.S. Trade Representative. 24  CFIUS reviews direct invest-
ments that impact U.S. national interests, and develops legisla-
tive and regulatory proposals in response to such invest-
ments. 25 Traditionally, non-U.S. corporations that intend to
merge with U.S. corporations have filed with CFIUS volunta-
rily.26
When the U.S. Congress enacted Exon-Florio, CFIUS at-
tained additional responsibilities.27 By Executive Order, the
President designated CFIUS to investigate and evaluate
merger and acquisition proposals voluntarily filed by non-U.S
corporations. 2 8 If a non-U.S. corporation fails to file its in-
24. CFIUS To Continue Reviewing Acquisitions Despite Lapse of Exon-Florio Provision,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1739 (Nov. 14, 1990); Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles
Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 325 (Feb. 19, 1992).
25. John E. Chierichella & Douglas E. Perry, Foreign Investment in Defense-Related
Companies, Fed. Contracts Rep. (BNA) 837 (May 8, 1989). In general, CFIUS could
make recommendations but had no enforcement powers or regulatory strength. Id.
26. CFIUS To Continue Reviewing Acquisitions Despite Lapse of Exon-Florio Provision,
supra note 24, at 1739. Despite the lapse in Exon-Florio between October 20, 1990
and August 17, 1991, CFIUS remained intact and continued to receive voluntary fil-
ings of proposed transactions. Id.
27. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618-24 (1988), reprinted in 19 U.S.C.
§ 2901 (1988); Elliot L. Richardson & Brad Larschan, Let the (Foreign) Buyer Beware,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 28, 1989, at 17. The increase in CFIUS' authority resulted in a
significant amount of criticism. John S. McClenahen, Deal Doomer?, INDUS. WK., Sept.
1989, at 81. For example, the former chairperson of the U.S. International Trade
Commission, Susan Liebeler, stated that Exon-Florio could do serious damage. Id.
She added that unless the new regulations were tightened, the United States could
ultimately discourage overseas investors by making it easier for future administra-
tions to implement a policy of economic nationalism. Id.
28. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618-24 (1988), reprinted in 19 U.S.C.
§ 2901 (1988). Originally, President Ford established CFIUS to monitor direct in-
vestment in the United States, Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990-92 (1971-
1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982). Subsequently, President Reagan delegated
to CFIUS the responsibility to review and investigate acquisitions involving foreign
interests under Exon-Florio. Let the (Foreign) Buyer Beware, supra note 27, at 17.
CFIUS initially has 30 days to determine whether it should investigate a pro-
posed transaction. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Produc-
tion Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 (1950)). Specifically, the Omnibus Trade Act provides
that
[i]fit is determined that an investigation should be undertaken, it shall com-
mence no later than 30 days after receipt by the President or the President's
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tended merger, acquisition, or takeover with CFIUS and still
enters into a transaction with a U.S. corporation, the transac-
tion is subject to divestiture by the President at any time in the
future. 29  Consequently, non-U.S. corporations intending to
merge with or to acquire a U.S. corporation are motivated to
file with CFIUS ahead of time, even if the potential impact on
national security is slight.3°
To date, Exon-Florio has not prevented a significant
amount of non-U.S. direct investment in the United States as
the President has exercised his authority under Exon-Florio
only once.3' In that instance, then-President George Bush or-
dered the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation ("CATIC") to divest itself of control over
MAMCO, a U.S. corporation.3 2 This case directly related to
national defense, 3  and thus national security, because
MAMCO manufactured aircraft components that could be con-
designee of written notification of the proposed or pending merger, acquisi-
tion, or takeover as prescribed by regulations promulgated pursuant to this
section. Such investigation shall be completed no later than 45 days after
such determination .... [Furthermore,] the President shall announce the
decision to take action ... not later than 15 days after the investigation ... is
completed.
Id. Thus, if CFIUS determines that an investigation is necessary, it must conduct
such an investigation within 45 days. Id.; Senate Subcommittee on International Finances
and Monetary Policy, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (June 4, 1992) (Tes-
timony of Mr. Chester Paul Beach, Jr., Acting General Counsel, Department of De-
fense). Ultimately, CFIUS prepares a report of its findings and recommends to the
President whether or not the transaction should be prohibited. Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act § 5021. The President, in turn, has 15 days to decide whether
or not to prohibit the transaction. Id. Thus, the entire process of evaluation re-
quires, at most, 90 days. Id.; see Chierichella & Perry, supra note 25, at 837.
29. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5021; see Banker, supra note 2, at
7.
30. See Banker, supra note 2. The broad definition of national security in Exon-
Florio, coupled with the constant risk of divesture, causes most investors to file under
Exon-Florio even in transactions in which national security problems are remote. Id.
31. Id. ; Jim Mendenhall, UNITED STA TES: Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions
Under the Exon-Florio Amendment-the MAMCO Divestiture, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 286
(1991). President Bush's action here marked the first time in which Exon-Florio was
used to block a transaction. Id.
32. Id. at 289-90. Before President Bush's decision in this case, the Chinese
corporation had already owned a portion of MAMCO. Id. at 291. Nevertheless, the
President concluded, based on credible confidential information, that CATIC's con-
tinued control of MAMCO might have threatened to impair national security. Id.
33. Id. Significantly, the President's decision to prohibit the merger in the
MAMCO case was based upon national defense considerations rather than a general
concern for national security which can be interpreted broadly. Id.
660 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:652
verted for use into military aircraft. 4 Ultimately, President
Bush prohibited the transaction because he concluded it ad-
versely affected national security. 5
Still, because President Bush has been the only President
to utilize Exon-Florio and has blocked only one transaction,
most non-U.S. investors readily comply with the Exon-Florio
filing provisions.3 6 Moreover, filing under Exon-Florio ulti-
mately protects the interests of the non-U.S. investor because
once the non-U.S. entity files with CFIUS and receives ap-
proval, which is almost inevitable, it is protected from future
suspension or prohibition with respect to that transaction. 7
Nevertheless, in contrast to former President Bush's
globalist policy on direct investment, President Clinton may
pursue a more protectionist policy.38 Commentators have
noted that President Clinton's position in this area is unclear.39
While some of the President's advisors have been viewed as
supporting relatively protectionist principles, others have been
viewed as supporting globalist philosophies.40 In the event
President Clinton takes a more protectionist position than that
of former President Bush, a larger number of transactions may
be blocked under Exon-Florio. 4 '
2. The Current Definition of "National Security"
The most controversial aspect of Exon-Florio involves the
term "national security."'4 2 Under its broadest interpretation,
the term could be said to encompass the economic well-being
34. Id.
35. Id. Ostensibly, the President blocked the merger in this case for "national
security" purposes under Exon-Florio. Id. Some critics have suggested, however,
that the actual reason for the President's action was the result of his opinion about
the Chinese government and its political system rather than the effect of the transac-
tion on U.S. national security. Id. at 294.
36. Barbara Franklin, Lapse in Exon-Florio; Uncertainty Affects Deals Involving For-
eigners, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1991, at 5.
37. Chierichella & Perry, supra note 25, at 837.
38. Getting His Way, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 1992, at 15.
39. Foreign Investment: U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Take-
overs, Seminar Told, supra note 4, at 180 (describing views ofSusanJ. Tolchin, profes-
sor of Public Administration at George Washington University).
40. Id.
41. See Banker, supra note 2, at 7.
42. Foreign Investment, EC Expresses Concern About U.S. Barring Thomson-CSF Take-
over of LTV Missiles Unit, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 35 (July 2, 1992). The
controversy surrounding "national security" has existed particularly in non-U.S.
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of the United States as well as the condition of the U.S. na-
tional defense.43 This position is based on the notion that all
substantial economic transactions, including defense industry
transactions, have some effect on national security.4 4 In con-
trast, a more narrow interpretation defines the phrase "na-
tional security" to include only those enterprises directly in-
volved in the production of national defense weapons.4 5 Most
commentators agree that industries involved in U.S. defense
production are covered under Exon-Florio.46 These industries
clearly affect national security and, consequently, the govern-
ment should monitor the control of these industries con-
stantly.47 A multitude of interpretations regarding- "national
security" exists, however, between the liberal and conservative
extremes .48
The most relevant interpretation of national security is
countries and involves questions relating to the scope and application of the term.
Id.
43. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1609, 1959. Both the original House and Senate versions of Exon-
Florio included the term "essential commerce" as one of the criteria for investigating
a particular merger or acquisition. Id.; Nowak, supra note 15, at 1013 n.70; see
Jonathan P. Hicks, The Takeover of American Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1989, at 1;
Samuel Fromartz, Law on Foreign Buyouts Assailed as a Potential Trade Weapon, Reuter
Bus. Rep., Dec. 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLWLD File. After
negotiations with the Executive branch, however, Congress agreed to redact the term
"essential commerce." OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFER-
ENCE REPORT, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1609, 1959.
44. Cecilia M. Waldeck, Note, Proposals For Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under
the Exon-Florio Amendment, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1211, 1215 (1991).
45. Chierichella & Perry, supra note 25, at 837. The Department of Defense has
played a major role in designating which types of defense-related transactions could
affect national security. Id.; see Banker, supra note 2, at 7.
46. See Chierichella & Perry, supra note 25, at 837 (describing specific defense-
production industries).
47. See Banker, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing which transactions relating to na-
tional defense should be monitored).
48. Id. The broad nature of "national security" permits a large array of inter-
pretations to exist. Id.
A collateral issue related to and arising under Exon-Florio involves the differing
viewpoints expressed of individuals commonly referred to as "protectionists" and
those referred to as "economic globalists." See id. Individuals belonging to the for-
mer group consider most, if not all, direct investment in the United States a threat to
the domestic economy. Id. Members of the latter group welcome such investment.
Id.
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that made by the U.S. Executive. 49  The President of the
United States ultimately decides which transactions affect "na-
tional security" under Exon-Florio,5 ° and, consequently, which
transactions should be suspended or prohibited.5 Therefore,
the definition of national security will vary depending on the
President's view.52 Specifically, under former President Bush's
globalist philosophy, 53 "national security" was read narrowly
to avoid interference with global trade and the free market.5 4
This philosophy is viewed as conservative because divestitures
were effectuated in as few instances as possible. 55  Under a
49. See Foreign Investment, U.S. Welcomes Foreign Investment, Urges Other Countries to
Do Same, President Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-6 (Dec. 30, 1991).
50. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1950)). While CFIUS initially scrutinizes transactions which are
filed with the Committee, the President makes the ultimate decision as to whether
such transactions threaten national security. Id.
51. Let the (Foreign) Buyer Beware, supra note 27, at 17. CFIUS' interpretation of
national security is dictated by the President's interpretation of the term because the
President retains the exclusive authority to decide whether to block a transaction on
the basis of national security. Id. Furthermore, depending on whether the Presi-
dent's interpretation of national security is broad or narrow, Exon-Florio will be ap-
plied, respectively, to prevent a larger or smaller number of international transac-
tions. Sidney Blumenthal & James Chace, Memo to Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1992, § 6, at 32.
52. Let the (Foreign) Buyer Beware, supra note 27, at 17.
53. The globalist philosophy which existed under President Bush's Administra-
tion could be significantly altered during the Clinton Administration. See Foreign In-
vestment: U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Takeovers, Seminar Told,
supra note 4.
54. George Bush, Statement Released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, U.S. Department of State Dispatch (Dec. 26, 1992), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURRNT File. The President's interpretation of "national security"
has been enunciated by an official White House Statement on December 26, 1991.
Specifically, it states, in relevant part, that
the United States provides foreign investors fair, equitable and nondiscrimi-
natory treatment as a matter of both law and practice. While there are ex-
ceptions, generally related to national security, such exceptions are few;
they limit foreign investment only in certain sectors, such as atomic energy,
air and water transport, and telecommunications. These exceptions are
consistent with our international obligations.
Id.
55. Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 19, 1992). This conservative interpretation of national se-
curity has incited much criticism regarding the overall application of Exon-Florio.
Id.; see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing MAMCO divestiture);
Mendenhall, supra note 31, at 294. At present, the MAMCO divestiture can be
viewed as a rare exception to the general rule of allowing direct investment in virtu-
ally all situations. id.
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more protectionist philosophy, President Clinton may be in-
clined to take a more liberal position and interpret the term
"national security" more broadly than did former President
Bush.5 6 Consequently, a broader range of transactions, includ-
ing those dealing with non-military commercial industries, may
be subject to suspension or blockage under the Provision.57
In drafting Exon-Florio, Congress refrained from defining
national security in order to encourage a broad interpretation
of the term.58 The U.S. legislature originally intended Exon-
Florio to apply to international transactions beyond national
defense, particularly those transactions closely related to com-
mercial security.59  Congress, however, encountered much
resistance from the Executive branch in passing this legislation
due to the latter's strong free trade policies.60 Consequently,
when the provision was ultimately enacted, it did not contain
any portions that strongly suggested the application of Exon-
Florio to commercial matters.6'
56. Getting His Way, supra note 38, at 15.
57. Id.
58. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1609, 1959.
59. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576. According to the House Conference Report, ac-
companying Exon-Florio, Congress' intent was confined to protecting national secur-
ity, without discouraging direct investment. Id.; Nowak, supra note 15, at 1006. Nev-
ertheless, when considering the conference report, it is possible to view Congress'
desire that the Act be applied to economic security as well as national security. Id. In
relevant part, the conference report states that
[t]he standard of review in this section is "national security".... the term
"national security" is to be interpreted broadly without limitation to particu-
lar industries .... [Factors to be considered] include but are not limited to
domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements... ; and the control of domestic industries ... as it affects the
capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of na-
tional security.
H.R. CONE. REP. No. 576.
60. See generally Thomas J. Soseman, International Law--The Exon-Florio Amendment
to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National Security or a Protectionist Weapon?, 15 J.
CORP. L. 597 (1990).
61. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1950)).
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B. The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1993
The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year
199362 (the "NDA Act") is a recent amendment to Exon-Florio
that modifies and supplements the Provision. 63 One such pro-
vision adds discretionary considerations for the President's use
in determining whether a transaction affects national secur-
ity.64 The President may analyze the potential effect of a pro-
posed transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or
technology to any country that supports terrorism.65 The
President may also consider the potential effects of the pro-
posed or pending transaction on U.S. technological leadership
in areas affecting U.S. national security.66
The NDA Act also requires mandatory investigations for
67
certain mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, the President
or the President's designee must investigate situations where
an entity, controlled by a non-U.S. government, seeks to en-
gage in a transaction with a U.S. company that could affect U.S.
national security. 68 Thus, investigations of certain transactions
are required, rather than subject to the discretion of CFIUS.6 9
62. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992).
63. Id. ; Foreign Investment, Thomson Bid to Acquire L TV Continues to Generate Fallout in
Congress, Court, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 189 (Sept. 29, 1992).
64. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Specifically, the proposed act states that
the President or the President's designee shall make an investigation, as de-
scribed in subsection (a), in any instance in which an entity controlled by or
acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any merger,
acquisition or takeover of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States that could affect the national security of United States.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. In addition to mandatory investigations, the NDA Act also requires firms
that are performing certain Department of Defense contracts to notify the Depart-
ment if they intend to perform part of the contract outside the United States or Can-
ada. Specifically, the NDA Act states that
[a] firm that is performing a Department of Defense contract for an amount
exceeding $10,000,000, or is submitting a bid or proposal for such a con-
tract, shall notify the Department of Defense in advance of any intention of
the firm or any first-tier subcontractor of the firm to perform outside the
United States and Canada any part of the contract that exceeds $500,000 in
value and could be performed inside the United States or Canada.
Id. § 840.
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In addition, the NDA Act prohibits specific non-U.S. firms
from buying certain U.S. defense companies.70 Under national
security programs, certain U.S. companies perform contracts
for the Departments of Defense or Energy with access to classi-
fied information. 7' Under the NDA Act, these companies are
restricted from acquisition by a non-U.S. entity.72 Likewise, if
the company being acquired has been awarded defense or en-
ergy contracts during the previous fiscal year in excess of
US$500,000,000, it is restricted from acquisition by a non-U.S.
entity.73
The NDA Act further modified Exon-Florio by requiring
the President to submit a written report to Congress on the
President's determination of whether or not to suspend or
block a transaction. 74 The report must include a detailed ex-
planation of the findings and factors that the President consid-
ered in deciding on the transaction.75 Finally, the NDA Act
suggests, but does not require, that the President include the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and
the Assistant to the President for National Security in the
membership of CFIUS.76
II. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO EXON-FLORIO IN
LIGHT OF THE LTV CASE
A number of proposals have been presented before Con-
gress and are designed to strengthen and further clarify Exon-
70. Id. § 824. In particular, the proposed act states that
no entity controlled by a foreign government may purchase or otherwise
acquire a company engaged in interstate commerce in the United States
that- (1) is performing a department of defense contract, or a department of
energy contract under a national security program, that cannot be per-
formed satisfactorily unless that company is given access to information in a
proscribed category of information; or (2) during the previous fiscal year,
was awarded- (A) Department of Defense prime contracts in an aggregate
amount in excess of $500,000,000; or (B) Department of Energy prime con-
tracts under national security programs in an aggregate amount in excess of
$500,000,000.
Id.
71. Acquisition Policy, Defense Authorization Bill to Include Claims Certification Provision,
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) D-3 (Oct. 5, 1992).
72. National Defense Authorization Act § 837.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Florio in its structure and application. 77 Specifically, the pro-
posed Technology Preservation Act of 1991 (the "TPA") and
the International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act of 1991
(the "Review Act") are designed to improve the current ver-
sion of Exon-Florio. 78 The Technology Preservation Act of
1991, a bill proposed in Congress, would expand Exon-
Florio's control over direct investment in the United States.79
Likewise, the International Mergers and Acquisitions Review
Act of 199180 is a proposed body of legislation that would
strengthen the direct investment review process under Exon-
Florio.8 Both of these proposed acts are intended to improve
the current version of Exon-Florio.82 A useful way of consider-
ing these proposed amendments is to discuss them in light of a
recent and controversial case involving the Provision.8
A. The L TV Case
In early 1992, the French state-owned company, Thom-
son-CSF, Inc. and two partners attempted to acquire the LTV
Corporation, a U.S. steel, defense, and aerospace firm.8 4 Spe-
cifically, Thomson, in conjunction with a U.S. investment firm,
77. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); In-
ternational Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
78. See supra note 77 (listing proposed acts, each of which sets forth specific
modifications to various aspects of the current Exon-Florio provision).
79. H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Exon-Florio Should Either Be Killed or
Enhanced, House Banking Panel Told, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 497 (Apr. 10, 1992).
80. International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991).
81. Id. Under a stronger review process, this proposed act would monitor and
regulate direct investment. Id.
82. H.R. 2624; H.R. 2631; Foreign Investment, Treasury Reiterates Opposition to
Changes in Exon-Florio, Industy Views Are Mixed, Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) D-10 (Apr. 6,
1992). Still other legislation has been proposed in the House of Representatives that
is designed to accomplish the same goals as the Technology Preservation Act. See
Foreign Investment and Economic Security Act, H.R. REP. No. 2386, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991), introduced by Reps. Mel Levine (D-Ca.) and Frank Wolf (R-Va.), as
reported in Bill Offered To Strengthen Law Governing Foreign Acquisitions, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) (June 19, 1991). Because of the similarity of this additional proposal to the
Technology Preservation Act, this Note will concentrate solely on the Technology
Preservation Act along with the two other proposals cited.
83. See Eric Schmitt, Administration Must Decide On LTV Unit's Sale to French, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 20, 1992, at D-I.
84. See Arshad Mohammed, France's Thomson-CSF Bids $400 Million for LTV Unit,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Apr. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
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the Carlyle Group, and a U.S. defense and auto company, GM
Hughes, made a bid of US$400,000,000 for LTV.85 Under the
terms of the bid, Thomson and GM Hughes' Hughes Aircraft
Co. would take control of the LTV Missiles Division, while
Carlyle would take control of the LTV Aircraft Division.
86
Among other regulatory hurdles, the Thomson bid was subject
to approval under Exon-Florio. 87
Following Thomson's bid, members of Congress sharply
criticized the proposed transaction mainly due to concern that
non-U.S. ownership of a U.S. defense business would pose a
threat to national security.88 Perhaps the most extreme oppo-
sition came from West Virginia Senator Robert C. Byrd, who
proposed a bill 89 to bar any non-U.S. company from purchas-
ing the LTV Corporation. 90 Senator Byrd insisted that there
was a strong possibility that Thomson would shift the LTV
subcontractor base from the United States to France, thereby
eroding U.S. defense manufacturing.9 Ultimately, CFIUS rec-
ommended that the President block the transaction following
the failure of Thomson-CSF and the U.S. Department of De-
fense to agree on special security arrangements ensuring U.S.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Harihar Krishnan, Loral Corp. Agrees to Buy LTV's Missiles Division, UPI, July
23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
89. S. 2704, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The bill states in relevant part that
[t]he Congress finds that the sale or other transfer to a foreign person of a
United States business concern that is critical to the defense industrial base
of the United States would be detrimental to the national security interests
of the United States .... Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any
agreement to the contrary, no foreign person may purchase or otherwise
acquire the LTV Aerospace and Defense Company.
Id. The bill goes on to define "foreign person" as "any foreign organization, corpo-
ration, or individual resident in a foreign country, or any domestic or foreign organi-
zation, corporation, or individual, that is owned or controlled by the foreign organi-
zation, corporation, or individual." Id.; see Foreigners Buying American, NAT'LJ.-Gov'T
EXECUTIVE, Aug. 1992.
90. Foreigners Buying American, supra note 89. The National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act sets forth a limitation on the sale of the LTV Corporation. National Defense
Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-
65 (1992). In particular, the Act requires that any contract between the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense and the LTV Aerospace and Defense Company include a provision
that requires the purchaser of all or part of LTV's operating assets, after April 1992,
to assume all the liabilities of LTV to its retired employees. Id.
91. Id.
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government control over sensitive information.9 2 Before the
President acted on the matter, however, Thomson withdrew its
original CFIUS notification and pursued discussions with other
U.S. companies to comply better with U.S. government secur-
ity restraints.93 Later the same month, the Loral Group, a U.S.
defense contractor, agreed to purchase the LTV Missile Divi-
sion in a transaction that reduced Thomson's interest in the
division to less than ten percent. 94
The LTV case illustrates a growing concern in the United
States that direct investment may threaten national security, as
well as the U.S. economy.95 Despite a globalist trade philoso-
phy that sharply criticizes such concerns, legislation has been
proposed in Congress ultimately to prevent the occurrence of
certain types of non-U.S. mergers and acquisitions, like the
LTV transaction, by strengthening Exon-Florio.96 This legisla-
tion has a broader scope than Senator Byrd's bill, because it
applies generally to all direct investment in the United
States.97
B. The Technology Preservation Act
The proposed Technology Preservation Act would amend
Exon-Florio in several ways.98 One of the most significant
changes under the proposed TPA involves CFIUS.99 Cur-
rently, the President determines and designates the individual
members of CFIUS and, thus, the composition of the Commit-
92. Victor I. Lewkow & Christopher E. Austin, Regulation of Foreign Investment in
the U.S., INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 1992, (Int'l M&A Supp.), at 71.
93. Thomson-CSF Tries to Restructure LTV Bid, Faces $20 Million Penalty by End of
July, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (July 22, 1992).
94. Krishnan, supra note 88.
95. Id.
96. Thomson Bid to Acquire LTV Continues to Generate Fallout in Congress, Court, Int'l
Bus. Daily (BNA) D-28 (Sept. 29, 1992).
97. Id.
98. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
While this act was proposed well before the LTV case occurred, nevertheless, it re-
flects the concern over the past few years that foreign mergers and acquisitions need
to be monitored more closely. Exon-Florio Should Either Be Killed or Enhanced, House
Banking Panel Told, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 497 (Apr. 10, 1992).
99. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
This section of the proposed act deals exclusively with the President's designee,
otherwise known as CFIUS. Id.
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tee is subject to change. 0 Under the TPA, however, the par-
ticular members of CFIUS would be codified.' 0 ' Specifically,
CFIUS would be composed permanently of the Secretaries of
Commerce, Defense, Treasury, Energy, and State Depart-
ments, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative, the Attorney
General, the National Security Advisor, and the Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology.'0 2 The TPA would
substitute the current chairperson of CFIUS, the Secretary of
the Treasury, with the Secretary of Commerce. 0 3
Another change under the proposed TPA involves the
overall investigation process of transactions filed with
CFIUS.'' 4 Specifically, the TPA would authorize the President
and CFIUS to conduct preliminary reviews to determine
whether a further investigation is necessary to evaluate the ef-
fects on national security of certain mergers, acquisitions, and
takeovers.10 5 Currently, no such review occurs before the for-
mal investigation process.10 6
Furthermore, in connection with the review and investiga-
tion of a merger, acquisition, or takeover of a U.S. company by
a non-U.S. company, the proposed TPA would allow CFIUS to
solicit written assurances from the non-U.S. entity that the
plans and intentions of such entity for the future operation of
the U.S. company would not impair national security.' 07 The
100. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990-92 (1971-1975), reprinted in 15
U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
101. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
102. Id.
103. Id.; see supra note 24 and accompanying text (detailing current composition
of CFIUS).
104. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; Bill Offered to Strengthen Law Governing Foreign Acquisitions, supra note 82.
Such assurances would be required in all transactions affecting national security. Id.
Specifically, the proposed act states that
(i) The President or the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States may, in connection with a review and investigation under paragraph
(1) of a merger, acquisition, or takeover of a United States person by a for-
eign person, solicit assurances from the foreign person that the plans and
intentions of such person for the future operation of the United States per-
son will not impair the national security. Such assurances shall be in writing
and shall, when received, be made available to each member of the commit-
tee.
Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
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TPA would also include additional factors that the President
could consider when deciding whether or not to block a trans-
action. ' 08
C. The International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act of 1991
Representative Philip R. Sharp of Indiana has introduced
the International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act of
1991109 as an alternative to the Technology Preservation
Act." l0 The proposed Review Act would amend the Clayton
Act,"' which requires the registration of certain mergers and
acquisitions in the United States on the basis of antitrust prin-
ciples."l 2 Initially, the Review Act would establish the National
Security Liaison Committee ("NSLC") to review all U.S. and
non-U.S. notifications filed under mandatory pre-merger noti-
fication provisions of the Clayton Act." l3  The proposed Re-
view Act would then bar any entity's acquisition of the voting
securities or assets of another entity unless both parties filed
notifications pursuant to the Review Act." 4
108. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1991).
These factors include the domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements, the capability of domestic industries to meet national defense require-
ments, and the United States and world market position of the persons engaged in
the transaction under investigation. Id.
109. International Mergers & Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991).
110. Treasury Reiterates Opposition to Collins' Ideas on Exon-Florio Changes, 24 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 458 (Apr. 3, 1992).
111. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1992)).
The Clayton Act addresses filing requirements for particular transactions and is in-
tended to protect the public against evils which result from the lessening of competi-
tion. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 297-98 (1930) (defining pur-
pose of Clayton Act in general). In short, the Clayton Act is designed to prevent
monopolies. See id. (discussing antitrust aspects of Clayton Act).
112. International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991).
113. Id. § 4. The Clayton Act involves U.S. mergers and acquisitions in general.
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1992). Subsequent to its enactment, the Clayton Act was amended
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which applies only to transactions in which the
parties involved are of a particular size (usually with net sales or total assets above
US$100,000,000) and the proposed transaction involves either the acquisition of at
least US$15,000,000 of voting securities or assets or the acquisition of 50 % or more
of the outstanding voting securities of a target with at least US$25,000,000 in annual
net sales or total assets. Victor I. Lewkow & Christopher E. Austin, Regulation of For-
eign Investment in the U.S., INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1992, (Int'l M&A Supp.), at 71-72.
114. International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991).
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Additionally, the Review Act would regulate transactions
where either the acquiring party or the party to be acquired
(the "target") is engaged in commerce, or in an activity affect-
ing commerce, and each meets a minimum net sales require-
ment. 115 Also, when the target has a contract with the U.S.
government that involves the target's access to classified infor-
mation, both parties would be required to file notifications., 1 6
Finally, the proposed Review Act would require a waiting pe-
riod, after filing with the NSLC, before the transaction could
be concluded." t 7
Under the Review Act, the NSLC would be required to re-
fer certain notifications, including any that might threaten or
impair national security, to the President or the President's
designee under Exon-Florio for investigation." t8  Thus, this
provision would apply to all transactions by U.S. as well as
non-U.S. entities bearing on national security; the Review Act
could function in conjunction with Exon-Florio." l9 Like the
TPA, the Review Act would also codify CFIUS but would des-
ignate somewhat different members.' 20  Specifically, the Re-
view Act would include the Chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors and the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget instead of the National Security Advisor and the
115. Id. Under the Review Act, notifications would be required by both parties
if, as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring party would hold fifteen percent or
more of the voting securities or assets of the target or an aggregate total of
US$15,000,000 of the same. Id. In addition, the Review Act would monitor transac-
tions in which the acquiring party or the target is engaged in commerce, or an activity
affecting commerce, and both are domiciled outside the United States. Id. The Re-
view Act would require notification by both parties where the combined net sales in
the United States of both exceeds US$350,000,000 and, as a result of the transaction,
the acquiring party would hold five percent or more of the target. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Specifically, the proposed act states that
[t]he National Security Liaison Committee established in section 7B may, by
rule in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code... require
that notifications required under subsection (a) contain such additional doc-
umentary information and material as is necessary and appropriate to en-
able the Committee to determine whether a proposed acquisition should be
referred, under section 7B(c)(2), to the President or the President's desig-
nee under section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950.
Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. § 5.
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Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
12
Likewise, the proposed Review Act would retain the Secretary
of the Treasury as the chairperson of CFIUS rather than re-
placing the office with the Secretary of Commerce as the pro-
posed Technology Preservation Act suggests.
122
The Review Act further suggests that the President negoti-
ate with other countries to establish agreements on the ex-
change of certain commercial and market information. 23 Such
information could be used to determine the possible anti-com-
petitive effects of transnational mergers and acquisitions.
2 4
Finally, the proposed Review Act would urge the President to
negotiate with other countries to establish dispute resolution
mechanisms that could deal with the regulatory overlap among
countries with respect to such mergers and acquisitions.
2 5
III. THE NEED FOR MODIFICATIONS TO EXON-FLORIO
THROUGH PROPOSED U.S LEGISLATION
In order to protect a country's economic and military se-
curity in an increasingly global market, strong legislation is re-
quired. Through the use of a voluntary filing system and im-
precise objectives, Exon-Florio fails to monitor and regulate
successfully direct investments vital to U.S. national secur-ity.126 By implementing key aspects of the proposed U.S. legis-
lation currently before Congress, Exon-Florio would become
more productive and effective. For these reasons, Congress
should amend Exon-Florio by implementing certain portions
of the proposed U.S. legislation.
A. The Need for Congressional Action
The United States must amend its approach to direct in-
vestment and can justify such an amendment without impeding
121. Id.
122. Id.; Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong, 1st Sess. § 2
(1991).
123. International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1991).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1609, 1959; Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews,
Lawyers Told, supra note 55.
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the U.S. globalist trade philosophy. 2 7  The current U.S.
merger legislation relating to non-U.S. direct investment is in-
adequate because it permits an overwhelming majority of non-
U.S. entities to merge with or acquire U.S. entities. 28 While
there are current filing requirements, including Exon-Florio,
and certain restrictions on transactions outlined in the recent
National Defense Authorization Act, practically no U.S. statute
closely monitors or discourages direct investment in areas as
vital as national defense. 29 In contrast, countries like France,
Italy, and Spain make direct investment, such as that in the
LTV case, extremely difficult in their respective countries. 30
For instance, if a U.S. company, controlled by the U.S.
government, wished to purchase a major French manufacturer
of France's military weapons, the U.S. company would encoun-
ter several obstacles to effecting such a transaction.'13 Con-
versely, however, under present U.S. legislation, the French
government, acting through a private company, would encoun-
127. White House Statement Announcing United States Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Policy, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1894 (Dec. 26, 1991).
128. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text (discussing structure and
function of present Exon-Florio provision).
129. Foreign Investment, U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Take-
overs, Seminar Told, supra note 4.
130. See supra note 13 (describing current legislation in France, Italy, and Spain
regarding direct investment).
131. CCH International, Doing Business in Europe (France), 25-680, 26,702;
SIMEON & AsSOClES, supra note 3. Currently, direct investments by non-residents are
subject to prior authorization of the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Budget. Id.
A direct investment in France is defined as
one or more operations that individually or together permit one or more
individuals or legal entities to create, or to obtain or increase their "con-
trol" over, an industrial, agricultural, commercial, financial, or real estate
enterprise or [an ongoing business] located in France.
Id.
Likewise, a non-resident investor who wishes to acquire a controlling interest in
a French company must file with the Treasury Department of the Ministry of Econ-
omy prior to the intended transaction. Jacques Epstein, et al., Foreign Investment Con-
trols, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1992 (Int'l M&A Supp.), at 41. Theoretically, the non-
resident investor must comply with the filing requirement only if the offer is for
twenty percent or more of a "listed" company. Id. In practice, however, this filing
requirement can be triggered by the acquisition of any form of control by the non-
resident party. Id.
In addition to the initial filing requirement, the non-resident acquiring party,
prior to completing the transaction, must submit to the Treasury Department of
France an additional document that describes the major points of the proposed
transaction as well as information about the acquiring entity, itself. Id.
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ter virtually no restrictions in the United States if it attempted
to acquire a similarly-situated U.S. manufacturer. 3 2 While the
National Defense Authorization Act has attempted to rectify
this situation by requiring mandatory investigations in certain
cases and completely prohibiting specific types of transactions,
it has not gone far enough. 33
In the LTV case, Thomson was not actually prohibited
from the original merger. 34 While it encountered much criti-
cism, particularly in Congress due to the proposed acquisition,
Thomson was never actually blocked from the transaction.' 3 5
Instead, the non-U.S. company found it easier to restructure
the transaction rather than pursuing the initial proposal any
further. 36 As the LTV case illustrates, Exon-Florio does not
significantly block transactions that are vital to national secur-
ity as do other countries. Therefore, the Provision should be
modified to better address U.S. concerns regarding direct in-
vestment. While modifications to Exon-Florio are imperative,
such modifications should only increase the strength of Exon-
Florio with respect to national defense. The United States
should not abuse Exon-Florio and extend it to serve commer-
cial security interests. Such an extension would constitute an
unnecessarily protectionist measure, which would adversely af-
fect the U.S. economy. Therefore, it is essential that any
amendment to Exon-Florio narrowly and directly benefit U.S.
national defense rather than purport to benefit the U.S. econ-
omy. This focused approach can best be achieved through a
more specific definition of national security.
132. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text (discussing LTV case and rel-
evant U.S. trade policies).
133. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory investi-
gations of certain transactions under the National Defense Authorization Act For Fis-
cal Year 1993).
134. Foreign Investment, Thomson-CSF Tries to Restructure LTV Bid, Faces $20 Million
Penalty by End of July, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 140 (July 21, 1992).
135. Id.
136. Id. Ultimately, Thomson did, in fact, purchase a portion of LTV. Loral
Announces Plan to Acquire LTV Missiles; Thomson-CSF Interest 9.976, Int'l Bus. Daily
(BNA) (July 28, 1992). Moreover, given the U.S. Executive's globalist trade philoso-
phy, it is possible that even the original investment proposal would have survived the
President's scrutiny under Exon-Florio, despite Congressional influences, if Thom-
son would have pursued it further. Harihar Krishnan, Loral Group Agrees to Buy LTV's
Missile Division, UPI, July 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
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B. The Current Exon-Florio Provision Should Be Modified to Adopt
Provisions Set Forth in the Recent Proposed U.S. Legislation
Congress should amend Exon-Florio in order to protect
U.S. national interests more effectively, particularly national
defense interests. Three major problems exist under the pres-
ent Exon-Florio provision. The first problem concerns the or-
ganization of CFIUS. t37 The present composition and control
of CFIUS does not best serve the interests of the United States.
A second problem with Exon-Florio involves the term "na-
tional security." This term is unnecessarily ambiguous and
thus problematic for all parties involved in international merg-
ers and acquisitions in the United States.1 38 Consequently, this
aspect of Exon-Florio must also be amended. A final problem
with Exon-Florio concerns its overall approach to monitoring
mergers and acquisitions in highly sensitive industries that are
vital to U.S. national security.' 39 Such mergers and acquisi-
tions must be regulated as closely as possible, without substan-
tially impeding the U.S. globalist trade philosophy.' 40 Solu-
tions to these problems can be derived, in part, from elements
of both bodies of proposed U.S. legislation. 4 '
1. Modifications to CFIUS
A major disadvantage to Exon-Florio is its failure to
clearly delineate the composition, authority, and role of
CFIUS. 142 Currently, CFIUS is a body of Executive branch
members whose administrative powers stem directly from the
President. 4 3 As the President's "designee," the very existence
137. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1609, 1959.
138. Chierichella & Perry, supra note 25, at 837.
139. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576.
140. See supra notes 6, 53-54 accompanying text (discussing traditional U.S.
trade philosophy under Bush Administration).
141. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); In-
ternational Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
142. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1609, 1959.
143. Foreign Investment, U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Take-
overs, Seminar Told, supra note 4.
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of CFIUS is subject to the President's own convictions."'
Theoretically, CFIUS's composition can vary depending on the
views of each particular President. 45 This instability does not
serve U.S. national security interests. The structure of CFIUS
should remain constant and intact, regardless of the Presi-
dent's convictions. A future President possibly could eliminate
CFIUS entirely.' 46 This situation undermines the importance
of CFIUS and its authority to monitor mergers, acquisitions,
and takeovers.
a. The Codification of CFIUS
The instability of CFIUS could be solved by codifying its
members, its authority, and its function through legislation.' 47
Consequently, the status of the Committee would be perma-
nent and the President would not be able to shift members into
and out of the group, or eliminate it completely. 4  Likewise,
codifying the composition, authority, and role of the Commit-
tee would strengthen its authority and prompt companies to be
more receptive to its requirements. If CFIUS were codified,
rather than implied under the current Exon-Florio provision as
the "President's designee," the Committee would be author-
ized to fully review and investigate direct investment under
Exon-Florio within designated time frames, as the Provision
suggests.' 49 Thus, codifying CFIUS would immediately clarify
its authority and role.
b. The Significance of Modifying the Composition of CFIUS
CFIUS is currently composed of Executive members who,
by definition, cannot serve the overall purpose of Exon-
144. Id.
145. Chierichella & Perry, supra note 25, at 837.
146. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing executive orders
implementing CFIUS and defining it as "president's designee").
147. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); In-
ternational Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
148. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); In-
ternational Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
149. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021,
102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988); see supra notes 101, 120 and accompanying text
(describing codification of CFIUS under proposed Technology Preservation Act and
International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act respectively).
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Florio. 150 For this reason, the composition of CFIUS must be
altered. Both the Technology Preservation Act and the Inter-
national Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act would partially
modify the current composition of CFIUS. 15 1 Of these two ap-
proaches, however, the Technology Preservation Act presents
the superior method. By requiring the National Security Advi-
sor to be included in CFIUS, along with the Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology, the Committee will be
better equipped to instruct the President on various mergers
and acquisitions that involve national security.1 52 As the Tech-
nology Preservation Act designates, CFIUS should also include
the Secretary of Energy as a member. The Secretary of Energy
could furnish CFIUS with the knowledge to understand better
the nuclear energy and weapons implications of certain merg-
ers and acquisitions. Currently, the United States is eliminat-
ing many of its nuclear weapons, forcing the sale of several
U.S. nuclear weapons facilities.' 53 Thus, it is important for
CFIUS to be fully informed about the capabilities of particular
companies that are being offered for sale to non-U.S. organiza-
tions. 154
c. The Need to Change the Chairperson of CFIUS
Another change that should be made regarding CFIUS
150. See supra text accompanying note 24 (discussing composition of CFIUS).
151. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); In-
ternational Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
152. H.R. 2624. The National Security Advisor is well-informed of the U.S. na-
tional security with respect to international events. See Remarks by General Colin
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the School of Advanced International
Studies (May 21, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File. Likewise,
the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology is well-suited to give ad-
vice on the nature of current U.S. technology, such as defense weapons, with respect
to other countries. See B.R. Inman & Daniel F. Burton, Jr., Technology and Competitive-
ness: The New Policy Frontier, FOR. AFF., Spring 1990, at 116.
While the National Defense Authorization Act has suggested that the President
include in the membership of CFIUS the Director of the Office of Science and Tech-
nology and the Assistant to the President for National Security, the Act does not
require the President to include these officials. National Defense Authorization Act
For Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992). Rather
than codifying the members of CFIUS by legislation, the Act leaves the status of the
Committee to the discretion of the President. Id.
153. Graeme Browning, Arms and the Global Economy, NAT'LJ.,June 13, 1992, vol.
24, No. 24, at 1436.
154. Id.
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concerns its chairperson. Currently, CFIUS is controlled by
the Secretary of Treasury. 5 5 As several critics have suggested,
the Secretary of Treasury has an institutional bias contrary to
the purpose of CFIUS.'5 6 The Secretary of Treasury must be
concerned, first, with reducing the deficit as much as possi-
ble. 5 7 Direct investment into the United States causes the def-
icit to decrease.'5 8 Consequently, the Secretary of Treasury
most likely will be more interested in encouraging direct in-
vestment in the United States than in monitoring and regulat-
ing such investment when necessary under Exon-Florio. 159
For these reasons, the chairperson of CFIUS should become
the Secretary of Commerce. As chairperson of CFIUS, the
Secretary of Commerce could allow the Committee to evaluate
better the trade situation in the United States without being
biased against CFIUS activity.' 61
d. Complete Disclosure of CFIUS and Presidential Decisions
Under Exon-Florio
Finally, one of the most significant programs that should
be adopted regarding the Provision is the mandatory disclo-
sure of virtually all Exon-Florio decisions.' 6 ' Under this pro-
gram, CFIUS would be required to publish any results it may
deduce regarding proposed transactions of non-U.S. parties in
155. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990-92 (1971-75 comp.), reprinted in 15
U.S.C. § 78b (1982); Chierichella & Perry, supra note 25, at 837.
156. Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, supra
note 55.
157. Id.; see United States Should Have 'Serious Debate' on Foreign Investment Policy,
ABA Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (May 1, 1991) (describing current secretary of
treasury's attention to the budget deficit and trade deficit).
158. Narrow Interpretation of Statute Hobbles Exon-Florio Reviews, Lawyers Told, supra
note 55.
159. Id.
160. The Technology Preservation Act proposes this very solution, which
should be included in any amendment to Exon-Florio. Technology Preservation Act,
H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
161. 'Major Reforms' in Monitoring Defense-Related Acquisitions Urged, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 19, 1992). While the National Defense Authorization Act requires
the President to submit a report to Congress regarding the President's determination
of whether to suspend or to block a transaction, the Act does not supersede Exon-
Florio's confidentiality element. National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992). Consequently, the Act does not provide
for public disclosure of Exon-Florio determinations. Id.
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the United States. 6 2 Decisions to permit such transactions or
refer them to the President would be disclosed. Furthermore,
in situations where the President actually blocks a merger or
acquisition under Exon-Florio, the President's rationale for
blocking such a transaction would be outlined. 63 Conse-
quently, when such a decision is questioned and controversial,
it would not be viewed as arbitrary or groundless.
This disclosure process would serve as a resource for the
parties to a blocked transaction who may wish to attempt an
adjusted merger in the future. It would also advise companies
that intend to merge in the future but have not yet entered into
negotiations. Publication of such decisions would enable these
investors to predict whether their future transactions would be
approved and would inform them how to structure their trans-
action to ensure passage under Exon-Florio. t 6' Finally, it
would cause Exon-Florio to be viewed as a rational mechanism
for preserving national security. With all these changes imple-
mented, the composition, authority, and role of CFIUS would
be defined more clearly and thus all future parties to direct
investment in the United States would benefit.
2. Clarification of National Security
As discussed, the ambiguous nature of the term "national
security" is a controversial aspect of Exon-Florio.165 This term
must be clearly delineated through legislation. Upon enacting
Exon-Florio, Congress left national security undefined because
it wanted to encourage a broad interpretation of the term. 1 66
In fact, Congress originally intended Exon-Florio to apply to
international mergers and acquisitions that were more closely
tied to commercial security. 67 However, when Congress en-
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing proposed Tech-
nology Preservation Act's suggested composition of CFIUS).
164. Id.
165. OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1609, 1959.
166. Id.
167. Id. According to the House Conference Report, accompanying Exon-
Florio, Congress' intent was confined to protecting national security, without dis-
couraging direct investment. Id.; see Nowak, supra note 15, at 1006. Nevertheless,
when considering the conference report, it is possible to view Congress' desire that
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countered executive resistance to this broad application of
Exon-Florio, it included the ambiguous term, "national secur-
ity," to encourage a broad reading of the provision and, thus,
to prevent as much direct investment as possible. 68
The ambiguous nature of the term should not continue to
provide a wide application of Exon-Florio to commercial trans-
actions. 6 9  In practice, the current definition provides the
President with the opportunity to block mergers or acquisi-
tions that do not concern national defense but may still bear
upon the economic condition of the United States. 70
Although a globalist President would probably not block such
transactions in the interest of free trade, in today's political cli-
mate a more protectionist President might be inclined to mis-
use Exon-Florio to prohibit a merger or acquisition that im-
pacts the U.S. economy.' 7 ' Under the current version of Exon-
Florio, such a protectionist President could justify his action
using a loose interpretation of national security.' 72
A rational definition of the term includes only those trans-
actions that closely bear on national defense. This interpreta-
tion constitutes the most effective definition of national secur-
ity because it would limit the possibility of protectionist abuses
under Exon-Florio. If the term is defined to reflect only those
transactions that relate to U.S. national defense, the Presi-
dent's ability to suspend or block non-U.S. direct investment
will be limited and more precise. 73 Consequently, transac-
tions that remotely affect national security, through their eco-
nomic implications, will not be prohibited unnecessarily. Fur-
the Act be construed as applying to economic security as well as national security.
Id.; see supra note 59 (reproducing language of conference report).
168. See generally Thomas J. Soseman, International Law--The Exon-Florio Amend-
ment to the 1988 Trade Bill. A Guardian of National Security or a Protectionist Weapon?, supra
note 60. Such resistance on the part of the Executive results from the President's
strong free trade policies. See id.
169. See Cecilia M. Waldeck, Proposals For Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under the
Exon-Florio Amendment, supra note 44.
170. See Mendenhall, supra note 31, at 286-87.
171. See generally Soseman, supra note 60; see also Nowak, supra note 15; Edward
Felsenthal, Threat to the Republic? The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States, 14 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 354 (1990). This occurrence is a strong possibil-
ity during the Clinton Administration. Getting His Way, supra note 38, at 15.
172. Felsenthal, supra note 171.
173. Foreign Investment, U.S. Has Uncoordinated Policy, Inadequate Controls on Take-
overs, Seminar Told, supra note 4.
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thermore, by limiting the term to transactions involving na-
tional defense, non-U.S. investors will be better-equipped to
determine ahead of time whether or not they will be blocked in
a particular transaction.
At present, the ambiguity of the term causes all who are
party to a direct investment that involves national security to
risk prohibition that bars completion of the transaction.' 74
U.S. companies that need to sell or merge with non-U.S. com-
panies are faced with the question of whether or not their
merger ultimately will be blocked after negotiations costing
time and money. 75 Moreover, if the President were ultimately
to block a merger in its later stages, both parties to the merger
would be discouraged from attempting further mergers or ac-
quisitions in the United States in the future. 76 U.S. legislation
that defines the term more narrowly and, thus, designates
which companies involve on national security would prevent
this problem. 177
The proposed Technology Preservation Act requires in-
vestigation of "critical technologies"' 178 and requires assur-
ances by the non-U.S. party that national security will not im-
paired by a particular transaction. 179 A more effective ap-
proach, however, would set forth, through legislation,
particular categories of transactions that definitively bear on
national security. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993 has partially accomplished this goal by sup-
plementing the definition of national security with specific
transactions and completely prohibiting such transactions. 0
Consequently, several transactions are defined for the public
and meaningless negotiations between the parties are
174. EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated With Exon-Florio, supra note 11.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Under Exon-Florio, the term "critical technology" is designated as that defined by
section 2368 of Title X of the U.S. Code or the most recent report submitted to the
President pursuant to the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization,
and Priorities Act of 1976. Id. Section 2368 of Title X was repealed by Act on De-
cember 5, 1991, P.L. 102-90, div. A, tit. VIII, pt. C, § 821(c)(1), 105 Stat. 1431.
179. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
180. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
484, § 835, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992).
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avoided.' 8 ' Still, the National Defense Authorization Act does
not extend far enough because it fails to address those transac-
tions that do not exceed US$500,000,000. 8 2 Thus, a signifi-
cant portion of direct investment is unaddressed by the NDA
Act.
Under the International Mergers and Acquisitions Review
Act, additional transactions would be delineated, but not nec-
essarily prohibited by definition. 83 For example, a company
that wants to acquire voting securities or assets of another
company would be required to file notifications and undergo a
waiting period if the target company has a contract with the
U.S. government that involves the availability to the target
company of classified information. 84
In practice, transactions requiring registration and ap-
proval could be divided into two main groups. One group
would consist of those transactions that clearly would be pro-
hibited by legislation. The National Defense Authorization Act
has already begun to regulate this group of transactions.' 85 In
order to preserve the U.S. globalist trade philosophy, this
group should remain very small and should consist only of
transactions that grossly and adversely affect the U.S. national
defense.
Those mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers that clearly af-
fect national security but do not pose a direct threat to national
defense would comprise the second group. These transac-
tions, therefore, should not be prohibited solely by definition.
This designation would benefit U.S. and non-U.S. companies
intending to invest by decreasing the risk of prohibition. In-
vestors that intend to enter into transactions restricted by leg-
islation would be better informed of the status of their transac-
tions in advance.
A more precise definition of national security, accompany-
ing the specific proscribed transactions, would eliminate many
non-U.S. investors' concerns about U.S. governmental ap-
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act, H.R. 2631, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
184. Id.
185. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
484, §§ 835-838, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992).
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proval of their transactions. 86 It would also remove their am-
bivalence towards investing in the United States because they
would know that the President could not randomly prohibit
the transaction for political reasons under a guise of discretion
for benefit of national security.18 7 Consequently, such a defini-
tion of national security would prevent a negative response in
other countries to the current broad definition of national se-
curity, which, at present, can be construed as excessively pro-
tectionist in nature. 88 Moreover, an updated definition of na-
tional security would prevent the term from varying according
to liberal or conservative interpretations of the executive
branch. 8 9 Eventually such a measure would encourage long-
term direct investment and, ultimately, would help the econ-
omy.' 9 0 For the foregoing reasons, the phrase "national secur-
ity" should be defined more narrowly to constitute mergers
and acquisitions bearing on national defense and should pro-
scribe particular transactions, as the Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1993 suggests.' 9 '
3. Increased Attention to Monitoring and Regulating
Direct Investment
A mandatory filing requirement for those transactions
which clearly affect national defense would best regulate direct
investment. 92 Transactions which grossly and adversely affect
national security by threatening U.S. defense should require
immediate disclosure with CFIUS and should be swiftly barred
under legislation. These transactions would include those al-
ready delineated in the National Defense Authorization Act.' 93
186. EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated With Exon-Florio, supra note 11.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Sidney Blumenthal & James Chace, Memo to the Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1992, § 6, at 32.
190. EC Complains of Uncertainty Associated With Exon-Flonio, supra note 11.
191. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992).
192. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text (discussing LTV case).
193. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463-65 (1992); see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text
(describing ramifications of LTV case). For example, under this act, an entity that is
controlled by a non-U.S. government could not purchase or otherwise acquire cer-
tain U.S. companies engaged in interstate commerce in the United States if the target
was performing a department of defense contract, or a department of Energy con-
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Other transactions, which indirectly bear on national de-
fense, should also require filing with CFIUS. An example of
this type of transaction would be one involving a dual-use tech-
nology. 19 4  In the event a non-U.S. company intended to
merge with or acquire a U.S. company that manufactured a
dual-use technology, such as computers, this transaction could
still be permissible if the target was not privy to information
that could compromise U.S. national security. 9 5 While a com-
puter company could theoretically be used to benefit the mili-
tary resources of the government of the non-U.S. company, af-
ter investigation it may be determined that the target computer
company would be used for non-military purposes. 96 In this
event, CFIUS would most likely allow the transaction to pro-
ceed. Thus, of these marginal transactions, those which do not
pose a serious threat to national security should not be blocked
as long as they pass investigation and review under CFIUS and
the President.
In addition, the parties to transactions that indirectly bear
on national defense should also be required to submit written
assurances to CFIUS that the transaction would not adversely
affect national security in the future. The Technology Preser-
vation Act would require such assurances and, thus, would in-
crease the likelihood that the transaction would not impair na-
tional security."' Furthermore, the proposed TPA would re-
quire CFIUS to investigate and later review the permitted
tract. Id. § 835. Such transactions would be prohibited if the U.S. company attained
its government contract pursuant to a national security program and the contract
could not be performed satisfactorily unless the company was provided access to
classified information. Id. Furthermore, under the proposed act, a non-U.S. entity
could not acquire a U.S. entity that was awarded certain department of defense or
energy contracts over US$500,000,000 during the previous fiscal year. Id.
194. See Nowak, supra note 15, at 1004. A dual-use technology is a technology
which has both military and civilian uses. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer Protection and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1990) (Testimony of Howard D. Samuel, President, Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO, and Clyde Prestowitz, President, Economic Strategy
Institute); see SARA L. GORDON & FRANCIS A. LEES, FOREIGN MULTI-NATIONAL INVEST-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1986).
195. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text (describing scope of "national
security").
196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (defining dual-use technologies
and relation to national security).
197. Technology Preservation Act, H.R. 2624, at § 2(B), 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
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merger in the future to determine if any subsequent national
security problems have developed.' 98 Thus, CFIUS would be
able to continue monitoring these transactions and continually
protect the national security.' 99
If national security is more clearly defined and certain
transactions are completely barred, voluntary filing for certain
transactions will not work. Non-U.S. investors will not be in-
clined to comply as readily with a voluntary filing system if
their proposed transactions are clearly prohibited. Likewise,
non-U.S. investors who enter into transactions that indirectly
affect national security would run a greater risk of prohibition
under a new definition of national security. Therefore, such
investors will also be reluctant to file voluntarily. For these
reasons, mandatory filing must be included in any proposal to
strengthen the Exon-Florio provision. Otherwise, the number
of intended transactions filed with CFIUS would diminish
greatly.
In the event a transaction that clearly bears on national
defense is not filed with CFIUS, it should be subject to imme-
diate divestiture by the President and both parties to the trans-
action should be penalized. Likewise, all transactions that af-
fect national defense indirectly should also require filing with
CFIUS and the parties to these transactions should be subject
penalties if they fail to do so. All other transactions involving
national security should continue to be filed on a voluntary ba-
sis. 20 0 Overall, these changes would improve the current sys-
tem and should be integrated into the current Exon-Florio
provision to make it more productive.
By implementing the specific amendments to Exon-Florio
discussed above, the U.S. will be able to selectively modify its
internal policy without harming its economy. In fact, many of
the changes mentioned will benefit the U.S. economy through
increased confidence in U.S. transactions and investment.
198. Id.
199. Id. Still, the Technology Preservation Act does not require filing of trans-
actions which clearly and adversely affect national security. Id. For this reason, the
proposed act is flawed.
200. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing incentive under
current voluntary filing system for non-U.S. entities to file with CFIUS). This re-
quirement would be necessary to ensure that even those transactions which do not
appear to affect national security indirectly, would still be filed with CFIUS if there is
a remote chance they could do so. See id.
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This suggestion is true particularly if Exon-Florio is confined
to national defense and not extended to economic security.
CONCLUSION
All of foregoing modifications to Exon-Florio would best
serve the interests of the United States because they would
strategically increase regulation in vital areas of U.S. national
security while at the same time maintaining the U.S. globalist
trade philosophy. The National Defense Authorization Act is a
step in the right direction but it does not modify the Provision
enough. Consequently, the U.S. Congress should further
amend Exon-Florio to define more clearly national security
and to require mandatory filing for a greater number of trans-
actions. Such an amendment should also modify the present
structure of CFIUS and mandate the publication of virtually all
CFIUS and Presidential decisions under the Provision. These
modifications would greatly improve Exon-Florio as it cur-
rently exists and benefit all involved in international mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers in the United States.
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